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PENNSYLVANIA'S ENROLLED BILL RULE
A REAPPRAISAL IN LIGHT OF HB 1413
AND VELASQUEZ v. DEPUY
I. SCOPE
The passage and repeal of the insurance premium tax' raise a
number of issues concerning the constitutionality 2 of the procedure
of their enactment.3 Those questions that can be answered by
examining the act on its face will be looked into by the courts.
4
Many questions, however, can be answered only by admitting other
sources of evidence. It is into this area that many courts are reluc-
tant to move.
This Comment will discuss the procedure behind the enactment
of the insurance premium tax and its repealer (hereinafter referred
1. Act of March 10, 1970, No. 67, [ ] Pa. Laws , repealed by
Act of March 16, 1970, No. 69, [ ] Pa. Laws
2. PA. CONST. art. II (1968), Part A sets out various sections con-
cerning the procedure of enacting legislation. The titles of these sections
are: § 1 Passage of Bills; § 2 Reference to Committee; Printing; § 3 Form
of Bills; § 4 Consideration of Bills; § 5 Concurring in Amendments; Confer-
ence Committee Reports; § 6 Revival and Amendment of Laws; § 7 Notice
of Local and Special Bills; § 8 Signing of Bills; § 9 Action on Concurrent
Orders and Resolutions; § 10 Revenue Bills; § 11 Appropriation Bills;
§ 12 Legislation Designated by Governor at Special Sessions; § 13 Vote De-
nied Members with Personal Interest.
3. Other recent examples of legislation which may have raised is-
sues concerning enactment procedure, but which are beyond the discussion
in this Comment, are HB 1412, 1969 Session; HB 1417, 1969 Session; and HB
2836, 1968 Session.
4. E.g., PA. CONST. art. III, § 3 (1968): no more than one subject
clearly expressed in the title; § 7: local or special legislation prohibited;
§ 10: revenue bills must originate in the House of Representatives; § 11:
restrictions regarding appropriation bills; § 12: restrictions regarding
special session legislation.
to as HB 1413 and HB 2045) and make preliminary conclusions as to
the validity of that enactment. It is not the purpose of the part of
this Comment dealing with the procedural issues of these two bills
to provide a detailed analysis of both sides of those issues; rather,
the purpose of that part of the Comment is to demonstrate that
valid arguments could be made in favor of, or against, the procedure
of enactment.
HB 1413 and HB 2045 serve as a vehicle to introduce the En-
rolled Bill Rule, most recently upheld in Pennsylvania by Velasquez
v. Depuy,5 which would bar any court from considering many of
the issues raised by HB 1413 and HB 2045. The paper will comment
on the Enrolled Bill Rule and its alternative approaches, analyzing
the reasons advanced for each approach. It will then examine the
holding in Velasquez v. Depuy and determine whether a court
court should base its decision to review on a distinction between
situations similar to Velasquez and those similar to HB 1413 and
HB 2045.
II. H.B. 1413: THE INSURANCE PREMIUM TAX
A. Factual Background of HB 1413
House Bill 1413 began as part of a tax package to help raise
revenue required by the $2.057 billion general appropriation bill.6
Its original version, Printer's Number 1769 (PN 1769), increased
from 2% to 3% the existing tax on gross premiums of all foreign in-
surance companies and domestic life and limited life insurance
companies. 7 The title to the bill read:
Amending the act of February 21, 1961 (P.L. 33) entitled
"An act imposing a State tax on gross premiums, premium
deposits and assessments received from business transacted
within this Commonwealth by certain insurance compa-
nies... ," increasing the rate of tax and further providing
for tentative reports.8
The bill was referred to the House Ways and Means Committee on
July 14, 1969, and was reported without amendments on July 15.6
On July 28, 1969, a minor amendment was proposed on the floor
of the House when the bill came up for third consideration and it
passed the House in this new version, as HB 1413, PN 1939, on
October 21.10
When it reached the Senate, HB 1413, PN 1939, was referred
to the Finance Committee where it received another minor amend-
ment and was reported as amended on December 16, 1969.11 After
receiving second consideration in the Senate, the bill was re-com-
5. 46 Pa. D. & C.2d 587 (Pa. C.P. Dauphin 1969).
6. H.B. 1365, Printer's Number 1670, 1969 Session.
7. H.B. 1413, Printer's Number 1769, 1969 Session.
8. Id.





mitted to Finance where it stayed from December 18, 1969, to Feb-
ruary 25, 1970,12 when it was re-reported. The Finance Committee
had rewritten the bill, now HB 1413, PN 2791.13 As explained in
the title, the new printer's number involved the amendment of a
different act:
Amending the Act of March 6, 1956 (P.L. 1228), entitled,
as amended, "An act to provide revenue for purposes of
public education by imposing a tax on the sale, use, storage,
rental or consumption of personal property and certain
services . . ." imposing a tax on premiums paid upon cer-
tain insurance policies.
14
The newly amended bill imposed a 6% tax on (1) premiums paid for
insurance written within the Commonwealth or (2) premiums paid
by persons residing or domiciled within the Commonwealth or (3)
premiums for insurance on persons residing or domiciled within the
Commonwealth or (4) premiums for insurance on property located
within the Commonwealth. The tax would be levied on the person
paying the premium, whereas direct payment, under the prior
printer's numbers, would have been made by the insurance com-
panies themselves. 15 HB 1413, PN 2791, passed the Senate the day
after its major new amendments.1 6 On the same day, it was sent
back to the House for concurrence on the Senate amendments,
where it was passed by a majority vote.
17
B. Issues Raised
The first issue raised by the enactment of HB 1413 is whether
there was a violation of Article III, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, by changing the "original purpose" of the bill during
its passage through the House and Senate.1 8 Since the presumption
is in favor of validity1 9 and this section, as well as most sections
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. H.B. 1413, Printer's Number 2791, 1969 Session.
15. Id.
16. HIsTORY OF HousE BiLLs, No. 1413, 1969 Session.
17. Id.
18. PA. CONST. art. III, § 1 provides: "[N]o law shall be passed ex-
cept by bill and no bill shall be so altered or amended, on its passage
through either House, as to change its original purpose."
19. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 233 A.2d 59 (Del. 1967); State
v. Clark, 247 Ind. 490, 217 N.E.2d 588 (1966); Richards Furniture Corp. v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs., 233 Md. 249, 196 A.2d 621 (1964); Mikell v. Phila-
delphia School Dist., 359 Pa. 113, 58 A.2d 339 (1948); State ex rel. Heck's
Discount Centers, Inc. v. Winters, 147 W. Va. 861, 132 S.E.2d 374 (1963).
See also Statutory Construction Act § 52(3), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 552 (3)
(1969). See generally Annot., 119 A.L.R. 456 (1938), 11 U. PiTT. L. REv.
670 (1949).
of Article III, is considered directory rather than mandatory,20 the
enactment must "clearly, palpably, plainly" violate the constitution
to be nullified.
2 1
To determine whether there has been a change of original pur-
pose, courts make a distinction between an amendment which
changes "the whole scheme of the law '22 and one which merely af-
fects "the details through which and by which that purpose is
manifested and effectuated. '23 In Allied Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Bell,24 the Missouri Supreme Court struck down a bill which had
gone through a change of original purpose. The court, in discuss-
ing what was meant by "original purpose", decided "it would seem
that the effect of the bill as introduced should have some weight in
determining its general purpose. "25
Applying these general rules to HB 1413, it could be argued that
the "original purpose" of the bill was changed. As introduced, the
bill provided an increase of one per cent in a tax on insurance com-
panies for receipts from business transacted in the Commonwealth.
As passed, the bill provided for a 6% tax, to be paid directly by the
purchaser, on insurance premiums paid for in Pennsylvania.
Though proponents of the constitutionality of the bill would con-
tend that the overall purpose in both versions was to provide a tax
and thereby to increase revenues, the titles of the two versions
stated that the bill amended specific acts; there was no reference
to the general subject of "taxation." In view of the reluctance to
invalidate acts, however, it would be reasonable to assume that a
court faced with this issue would consider the overall purpose to be
the imposition of some sort of a tax. Nevertheless, the issue is argu-
able and if the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court2 6 were to con-
sider the bill 27 it would have considerable difficulty in determining
that there was no violation of Article III, section 1.
The second procedural issue raised by HB 1413 involves a pos-
sible violation of Article III, section 4, which provides inter alia:
"Every bill shall be considered on three different days in each
House. ' 28 If the effect of the Senate amendments was to create a
20. See Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401 (1877); 1 T. COOLEY, CONSTITU-
TMONAL LIMITATIONS 286-91 (8th ed. 1927).
21. Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. 147, 164 (1853).
22. Massey v. Philadelphia, 1 W.N.C. 140, 141 (Pa. C.P. Philadel-
phia 1874).




26. Jurisdiction in the matter of appeals challenging the constitution
ality of legislation is vested in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.
See Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, Act of Sept. 11, 1970, No. 223,
[ ]Pa. Laws
27. At present, the Enrolled Bill Rule would preclude consideration
of this issue.
28. PA. CONST. art. III, § 4 (1968).
Notes
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new bill, a literal reading of Article III, section 4, would require
that, after the amendment, the bill must be considered on three dif-
ferent days. It should be noted that PN 2791 was reported to the
floor of the Senate on February 26. The bill then received third
consideration and was passed by a majority vote. On the same day,
this new version was sent back to the House, which concurred in
the Senate amendment. If PN 2791 consituted a new bill, it did not
receive consideration on three different days.
Whether a material amendment constitutes a new "bill" within
the meaning of Article III, section 3, seems to be a question of first
impression in Pennsylvania. 29 The general rule is that amendments
do not create new bills and that the bill need not be re-considered
after amendment. 0 At least one case, however, has held that after
a material amendment, the bill must be reconsidered as if it were
new.31 In addition, dictum in a 1948 Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision3 2 suggests that if the amendment were extensive, there
would either be a change of original purpose or a new bill.
33
The purpose of the drafters of this section of the Pennsylvania
Constitution would certainly be an important factor in determining
whether HB 1413 was considered on three different days. In Scud-
der v. Smith,3 4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:
The purpose of the constitutional requirements relating to
the enactment of laws was to put the members of the As-
sembly and others interested, on notice, by the title of the
measure submitted, so they might vote on it with circum-
spection5
In light of modern communication facilities between the two Houses
and the importance and notoriety of the bill, it is doubtful that a
court would find-perhaps by judicial notice-that the legislators
did not receive notice of the changes made in HB 1413. It is sub-
29. One case which defined "bill" in Article III, section 3, of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, involved "questions of an informal resolution"
(Scudder v. Smith, 331 Pa. 165, 200 A. 601 (1938)) and the court held that
a "resolution" was not a "bill". Another, Southwark Bank v. Common-
wealth, 26 Pa. 446, 450 (1856), defined a bill as ". . . the draft or form of
an act presented to the legislature but not enacted."
30. See, e.g., People ex rel. County Collector v. Jeri, Ltd., 40 Ill. 2d 293,
239 N.E.2d 777 (1968); United States Gypsum Co. v. State, 363 Mich. 548,
110 N.W.2d 698 (1961). See also 50 AM. JuR. Statutes § 82 (1938).
31. Cohn v. Kingsley, 5 Idaho 416, 49 P. 985 (1897).
32. Mikell v. Philadelphia School District, 359 Pa. 113, 58 A.2d 339
(1948).
33. "... the Senate may amend a House revenue bill even to the ex-
tent of striking out everything following the enacting clause and substi-
tuting therefor a bill of its own creation." Id. at 123, 58 A.2d at 349.
34. 331 Pa. 165, 200 A. 601 (1938).
35. Id. at 170-71, 200 A. at 606-07 (emphasis in original).
mitted that a court would determine there was no violation of Arti-
cle III, section 4.
III. H.B. 2045: REPEAL oF HB 1413
A. Factual Background of HB 2045
HB 2045, PN 2865, repealed the 6% on insurance premiums,
which had become law without the Governor's signature on March
10, 1970.36 As originally introduced, however, HB 2045 did not con-
tain the repealer.37 The title to the original version read:
Amending the act of March 6, 1956 (P.L. 1228), entitled, as
amended, "An act to provide revenue for purposes of public
education by imposing a tax on the sale, use, storage,
rental or consumption of personal property and certain
services . . ." eliminating the exclusion of property pur-
chased outside of Pennsylvania by a business moving into
Pennsylvania.
3 8
The effect of the bill was to amend the "Tax Act of 1963 for Educa-
tion" by eliminating a certain exclusion from tax which existed un-
der prior law.s 9 The bill was referred to the House Ways and
Means Committee on February 12, 1970, and was recommitted on
February 25 after second consideration. 40 On February 26, the 6%
tax on the sale of insurance premiums received final passage.
41
On March 10 it became Act No. 67.42
The same day the tax on insurance premiums became law, HB
2045 was re-reported from Ways and Means. 43 It had been com-
pletely rewritten.4 4 The title to the bill now read:
Relating to state taxation; changing the manner in which
tentative and annual taxes are to be paid; providing a pen-
alty in certain cases; and making a repealer.
45
The new printer's number did two things: it changed the accelera-
tion provisions of various business taxes including the corporate
net income tax, the capital stock and franchise tax, the public utility
gross receipts tax and the bank shares tax; it also repealed the 6%
tax on insurance premiums. 46  HB 2045, PN 2865, became Act No.
69 on March 16, 1970.
4 7
B. Issues Raised
The first procedural issue concerning HB 2045 is whether PN
36. HISTORY OF HOUSE BILs, No. 2045, 1969 Session.
37. H.B. 2045, Printer's Number 2691, 1969 Session.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. HISTORY OF HOUSE BmLs, No. 2045, 1969 Session.
41. Id., No. 1413.
42. Id.
43. Id., No. 2045.
44. H.B. 2045, Printer's Number 2865, 1969 Session.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS, No. 2045, 1969 Session.
Notes
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2865 changed the "original purpose" of PN 2691.48 The effect of the
new version of the bill was to remove one source of revenue-the
tax on insurance premiums-and substitute another source-an
acceleration of payment due dates of certain existing taxes.49 The
original version did nothing more than eliminate an exclusion
from tax which existed under prior law.50 Thus, the difference in
the effect of the two versions of the bill was substantial.
If a court were to apply the rule in Allied Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Bell,5 1 that the effect of a bill reflects its purpose,5 2 it would
probably conclude that the original purpose was changed. How-
ever, considering the presumption in favor of validity,5 and the
distinction drawn between the "whole scheme" of the bill and the
"mere details" 4 through which that scheme is realized, contestants
of the bill would be hard-pressed to get a favorable decision.
A second procedural issue could be decided by analyzing the
face of the act. Did HB 2045, PN 2865, violate Article III, section 3,
which says that "[n] o bill shall be passed containing more than one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title,. .. ?55
The purpose of this section of the Constitution is to prevent
fraud and surprise or a combination of non-related subjects5" and
to provide reasonable warning to the legislature and the public of
what may actually be found.5 7 Generally, the title satisfies this
section if it puts an interested person on inquiry as to the exact
scope of the indicated subject.50 It has been held that plurality of
48. PA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1968).
49. H.B. 2045, Printer's Number 2865, 1969 Session.
50. H.B. 2045, Printer's Number 2691, 1969 Session.
51. 353 Mo. 891, 185 S.W.2d 4 (1945). See notes 23-25 and accom-
panying text supra.
52. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
53. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
54. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
55. PA. CONST. art. III, § 3 (1968).
56. E.g., State v. Shaw, 50 Del. 193, 126 A.2d 542 (1956); State ex
rel. Indiana Real Estate Comm'n. v. Meier, 244 Ind. 12, 190 N.E.2d 191
(1963); People v. Carey, 382 Mich. 285, 170 N.W.2d 145 (1969); Ullom v.
Boehm, 392 Pa. 643, 142 A.2d 19 (1958); Kotch v. Middle Coal Field Poor
Dist., 329 Pa. 390, 197 A. 334 (1938).
57. E.g., L.J.W. Realty Corp. v. Philadelphia, 390 Pa. 197, 134 A.2d
878 (1957); Commonwealth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 369 Pa. 560, 87 A.2d
255 (1952); Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v. Commonwealth, 366 Pa. 574,
79 A.2d 449 (1951); Harr v. Boucher, 142 Pa. Super. 114, 15 A.2d 699
(1940).
58. E.g., Wilson v. State, 264 A.2d 510 (Del. 1970); In re Opinion of
Justices, 246 A.2d 90 (Del. 1968); State v. Jackson, 239 A.2d 215 (Del.
1968); Opinion of the Justices, 194 A.2d 855 (Del. 1963); County of Hills-
borough v. Price, 149 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1963); Ullom v. Boehm, 392 Pa. 643,
142 A.2d 19 (1958); Ewalt v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n., 382 Pa.
529, 115 A.2d 729 (1955).
subjects is not objectionable if they are reasonably germane.59
It should be noted that the title to HB 2045, PN 2865, begins
with the phrase: "Relating to taxation. ... 60c The question
arises whether this clearly expresses the subject of the bill. Lan-
guage similar to this has been held to be sufficient to impose a tax
on individuals6 ' and to give notice of a license on foreign corpora-
tion offices. 2 These holdings suggest that the introductory clause
would satisfy the constitutional requirement that the title clearly
express the subject matter of the bill.
The substance of the bill is to provide for an acceleration of tax
payments and to make a repealer. Are these two separate subject
matters or is the general subject "taxation"? In light of evidence
that courts are reluctant to find two subjects6 3 and that courts will
emphasize overall "scheme" rather than "mere details, '64 an argu-
ment that HB 2045 contained two unrelated subjects would probably
fail. This is particularly so considering that a decision invalidating
HB 2045 would effectively reinstate HB 1413 and its much-criti-
cized tax on insurance premiums.
IV. ENROLLED BILL RULE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
HB 1413 and HB 2045 have raised questions of the constitu-
tionality of the procedure of their enactment. However, in nearly
half the jurisdictions of the United States, including the federal
courts,65 there is a conclusive presumption that the procedure of en-
actment of an enrolled bill66 was valid. In those jurisdictions, a
determination of the issues raised in the discussion of HB 1413 and
HB 2045-with the exception of those which can be decided by ex-
amining the act on its face-would be precluded by the application
of the Enrolled Bill Rule. On the other hand, a number of jurisdic-
tions have either modified or rejected the Enrolled Bill Rule and
have adopted the Journal Entry Rule6 T or some other form of either
59. Lehigh Navigation Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 133 Pa. Super.
67, 1 A.2d 540 (1938).
60. H.B. 2045, Printer's Number 2865, 1969 Session.
61. Commonwealth v. Martin, 107 Pa. 185 (1884).
62. Commonwealth v. Conglomerate Mining Co., 5 Dauph. 66 (Pa.
C.P. 1883).
63. Commonwealth v. Charity Hosp., 198 Pa. 270, 47 A. 980 (1901);
Clearfield County v. Cameron Township Poor Dist., 135 Pa. 86, 19 A. 952
(1890); Cornell v. State Tax Comm'n., 11 Utah 2d 249, 358 P.2d 79 (1960).
64. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
65. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). See generally 1 J. SUTHER-
LAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 1401-22 (3d ed. 1943).
66. Enrolled Bill: "In legislative practice, a bill which has been duly
introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of
each, approved by the Governor (or president) and signed by the secretary
of state." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 624 (4th ed. 1957).
67. See notes 105-125 and accompanying text infra. Basically, the
Journal Entry Rule provides that the entries made in the daily journals of




Rule. Depending on whether they merely modified the Enrolled
Bill Rule or rejected it in favor of the Journal Entry Rule, these
courts would determine the procedural issues surrounding HB 1413
and HB 2045.
A. Enrolled Bill Rule
Under a strict application of the Enrolled Bill Rule, the pro-
cedural issues concerning any enrolled bill will not receive judicial
consideration. An enrolled bill is conclusively presumed to be
valid; the journal or any other sources of evidence are incompetent
to challenge the validity of such a bill.69
A number of arguments have been advanced in favor of the
adoption of the Enrolled Bill Rule. The one most often relied upon
is that the doctrine of separation of powers mandates that the ju-
diciary refrain from encroaching on the responsibilities of the legis-
lature.6 In Field v. Clark,70 an early United States Supreme Court
decision often cited for the Enrolled Bill Rule, the court held:
The respect due to coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon the assur-
ance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills au-
thenticated in the matter stated: leaving the courts to de-
termine, when the question properly arises, whether the
act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitu-
tion.
71
Another early decision, in New Jersey, declared that the doctrine of
separation of powers was consonant with practical considerations:
The body that passes a law must of necessity promulgate it
in some form. . . We are also to reflect that it is the
power which passes the law, which can best determine
what the law is which itself has created.
72
Whether or not separation of powers demands that the judi-
68. Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 650 (1892); People v.
McCullough, 210 Ill. 488, 71 N.E. 602 (1904); Pangborn v. Young, 32
N.J.L. 29 (Sup. Ct. 1866); Mikell v. Philadelphia School Dist., 359 Pa. 113,
58 A.2d 339 (1948); Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401 (1877); Speer v. Plank-
Road Co., 22 Pa. 376 (1853); Velasquez v. Depuy, 46 D. & C.2d 587 (Pa.
C.P. Dauphin 1969); Massey v. Philadelphia, 1 W.N.C. 140 (Pa. C.P. Phila-
delphia 1874); 4 J. WIOMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1350 (3d ed. 1940); 50 AM. Jur.
Statutes § 149 (1938); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 973 (1949); 11 U. PITT. L. REV.
670 (1949).
69. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 650 (1892); Pangborn v. Young, 32 N.J.L.
29 (Sup. Ct. 1866); Velasquez v. Depuy, 46 D. & C.2d 587 (Pa. C.P. Dau-
phin 1969); State ex Tel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 34 P. 201 (1893).
70. 143 U.S. 650 (1892).
71. Id. at 672.
72. Pangborn v. Young, 32 N.J.L. 29, 36 (Sup. Ct. 1866).
ciary stay away from the "political thicket,1 3 courts have recently
retreated from the doctrine in two major areas. In Baker v. Carr,
74
the United States Supreme Court held that federal courts could
hear a petition for reapportionment of the Tennessee legislature, say
ing that "[t] he political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance
of governmental order, will not be so applied as to promote only
disorder" 7 and that "[t] he courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a
bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated
'political' exceeds constitutional authority." 76
Bond v. Floyd77 represents the second legislative area which
courts will now examine. In that case, the Georgia legislature
twice refused to seat Julian Bond, a duly elected representative, on
the grounds that certain statements he made concerning Vietnam
and the draft disqualified him from membership in the House of
Representatives.78  Bond filed a claim in federal court for injunc-
tive relief and a declaratory judgement. The issue before the court
was whether jurisdiction could be obtained over a question of dis-
qualification of members from a legislative branch. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court held that the court had jurisdiction
to decide the case7 9 and that Bond's disqualification was a violation
of free speech under the first amendment.8 0
The claim of Julian Bond was that to forbid him from taking
the oath of office would be to violate his first amendment rights.
For this reason, any argument citing the recent willingness of courts
to retreat from the doctrine of separation of powers must either be
grounded upon a constitutionally protected right or rely on Baker
v. Carrs ' rather than the Bond case. This was pointed out in a
1968 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Harrington v. Carroll:2
It must be perceived by even half a glance through consti-
tutional windows that the decision of the Supreme Court
73. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556
(1946).
74. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
75. Id. at 215.
76. Id. at 217. The one-man-one-vote ruling in Baker v. Carr has
been applied and extended in the following cases: Avery v. Midland
County (Texas), 390 U.S. 424 (1968); Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly,
377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Maryland
Committee v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633
(1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368 (1963).
77. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
78. Id. at 125.
79. Id. at 131.
80. Id. at 136.
81. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
82. 428 Pa. 510, 239 A.2d 437 (1968). Justice Musmanno, writing for a
majority of four, held that the court did not have jurisdiction to decide a
suit to enjoin a person elected to the Philadelphia City Council because
he was not a resident of Philadelphia. The court held that the provision of
the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, § 2-103, that "it]he Council shall
be the sole judge of the qualifications of its members" made the City
Council the sole authority to determine the question.
Notes
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in the Bond case can have no application to the Kelly
case where no constitutional question is involved and where
the only issue to be decided is the residence of Kelly .... 3
The court in Harrington concluded that the doctrine of separation
of powers prevented extension of the Bond case to the situation
where no constitutional issue is raised:
To argue that the right of the legislatures to determine the
qualifications of its members is a wall which should be
shattered is to maintain that representative government is
on the way toward its own demolition. . . . And it is our
duty, within the framework of those constitutions, to de-
fend that wall by upholding the sanctity of the system of
constitutional separation of powers.
8 4
A second reason for the Enrolled Bill Rule is that an alterna-
tive, either the Journal Entry Rule or a rule allowing extrinsic
evidence in certain instances, would lead to a floodgate of cases and
chaos concerning the status of legislation.8 5 In Ex parte Wren, 6 a
case cited approvingly by the United States Supreme Court in Field
v. Clark,8 7 the Mississippi Supreme Court said:
If the validity of every act published as law is to be tested
by examining its history, as shown by the journals of the
83. Id. at 519, 239 A.2d at 446 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 519-20, 239 A.2d at 446-47. An argument closely related to
Justice Musmanno's reasoning in Harrington and the separation of powers
doctrine is that a court has no right to delve into questions of legislative
procedure. In Pennsylvania, three cases have expressed this approach in
different ways: Mikell v. Philadelphia School Dist., 359 Pa. 113, 123, 58 A.2d
339, 346 (1948) ("a failure of the legislature to follow a directory provision
of the Constitution, respecting the introduction and passage of legislation,
does not present a justiciable question..."); Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa.
401, 412 (1877) ("In regard to the passage of the law and the alleged disre-
gard of the forms of legislation required by the Constitution, we think the
subject is not within the pale of judicial inquiry."); Massey v. Philadelphia,
1 W.N.C. 140, 142 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia 1874) (". . . this Court had no
right to examine into what took place on the passage of the bill through
the two Houses of the Legislature"). In State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6
Wash. 452, 455-56, 34 P. 201, 204-05 (1893), a case cited for support in
Velasquez, the court said that "[t]his line of reasoning [in support of ju-
dicial determination] seems to assume that the judicial department is
charged with seeing that all the mandatory provisions of the Constitution
are complied with. But is this a reasonable construction in view of our
theory of government. . . .?") (emphasis in original).
85. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 650 (1892); State ex rel. Cline v. Schricker,
228 Ind. 41, 88 N.E.2d 746 (1949); Ex parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512 (1886);
Pangborn v. Young, 32 N.J.L. 29 (Sup. Ct. 1866); Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa.
401 (1877); Velasquez v. Depuy, 46 D. & C.2d 587 (Pa. C.P. Dauphin 1969);
Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 34 P. 201 (1893). See also 1 J. SUTmELAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 1401-22 (3d ed. 1943); 50 AM.
Jun. Statutes § 150 (1938).
86. 63 Miss. 512 (1886).
87. 143 U.S. 650, 676 (1892).
two houses of the legislature, there will be an amount of
litigation, difficulty and painful uncertainty appalling in its
contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the alleged
uncertainty of the law.88
Related to the floodgates and chaos argument is a doctrine of
convenience by which courts have felt that the Enrolled Bill Rule
prevents difficult questions involving proof by, and authentication
of, journals and other forms of extrinsic evidence.8 9
The floodgates-chaos argument and doctrine of convenience
perhaps carry more weight today, with the crowded conditions of
our courts, than they did when first applied. But they are also
open to valid criticism. Should the courts condone legislation ille-
gally enacted because to allow appeals would be to overburden the
already crowded dockets? The solution seems to be to increase the
number of judges and courts rather than to prevent appeals on the
basis of the doctrine of convenience or the floodgates argument.
A third argument in favor of the Enrolled Bill Rule is that rem-
edies to the improper passage of legislation are provided both to the
legislators and their constituents. In chronological order, the first
remedy available to a legislator would be to make a motion to lay
the bill on the table.90 After the vote is taken on the bill, a motion
to reconsider 9' the vote may be made. In Pennsylvania, this motion
must be made "on the same day on which the vote proposed to be
reconsidered was taken or within the succeeding five days in which
the House is in session. '9 2 If neither of these motions is used, a
third remedy is to draft a bill or resolution recalling the bill from
the Senate or, if need be, from the Governor.9" In Mikell v. Phila-
delphia School District,94 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
88. 63 Miss. 512, 527 (1886).
89. Velasquez v. Depuy, 46 D. & C.2d 587, 619 (Pa. C.P. Dauphin 1969).
See 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1402
(3d ed. 1943); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1350 (3d ed. 1940); 50 AM. JuR.
Statutes § 150 (1938).
90. Rule 77 of the RULES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESEN-
TATIVES provides that "JEFFERSON'S MANUAL supplemented by MASON'S
MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE shall be the parliamentary authority of
the House .... " PA. HOUSE REP. R. 77. Rule XVI of JEFFERSON'S MANUAL
provides:
The motion to lay on the table is used in the House for a final,
adverse disposition of a matter without debate [citation omitted]
.... The motion to lay on the table has the precedence given it
by the rule, but may not be made after the previous question is
ordered [citation omitted], or even after the yeas and nays have
been ordered....
JEFFERSON'S MANUAL R. XVI § 785.
91. PA. HOUSE REP. R. 26.
92. Id.
93. Id. R. 36. This Rule provides that:
Resolutions privileged for the immediate consideration of the House
are those:
a. Recalling from or returning bills to Governor.
b. Recalling from or returning bills to Senate. ...
Id.
94. 359 Pa. 113, 58 A.2d 339 (1948).
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ferred to this type of remedy:
. . . any failure to follow [a particular constitutional provi-
sion] must be objected to timely. If that is done, as on a
point of order, the objection would, of course, be efficient
to block the passage of the measure."
The opposite view, however, has been taken in Allied Mututal In-
surance Company v. Bell,96 where no member of either House ob-
jected to a bill which was ruled invalid on appeal because there had
been a change of original purpose during its passage. The court in
Allied held that failure by the legislators to object to the form or
substance of a bill is persuasive only and not conclusive in cases
where "original purpose" is challenged.
9 7
In addition to these remedies available to legislators, others are
available to the people they represent. One of these would be to
petition the legislators to move for a repeal of the particular piece of
legislation involved. This was done, but not for reasons of possible
procedural infringements, with the tax on insurance premiums.
98
Another remedy, which does not alleviate the objection to having
laws on the books which were not constitutionally enacted, is to
vote out the members of the legislature and hope that the new
legislature will not abuse the procedural provisions. 9
A final reason advanced in favor of the Enrolled Bill Rule is
that the alternative Journal Entry Rule is conducive to mistake
and fraud.100 This line of reasoning emphasizes that the journal
could easily contain a misprint or be subject to manipulation by nu-
merous methods. In Pangborn v. Young,' 0' this problem of possible
fraud or mistake was recognized when the court said the journals
had poor evidentiary reliability because the markings were made
"partly in pencil, partly in ink, and of scraps in print, taken from
newspapers.' 01 2 It went on: "The misplacing of a name on a nicely
balanced vote, might obviously invalidate any act .... We are to
95. Id. at 123, 58 A.2d 346. See also Velasquez v. Depuy, 46 D. & C.2d
587, 594, 607 (Pa. C.P. Dauphin 1969); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the
Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 571 (1966)
(". . . the inaction of the majorities in Congress [may be regarded as]
conclusive evidence that no such mistakes had in fact occurred.")
96. 353 Mo. 891, 185 S.W.2d 4 (1945).
97. Id. at 897, 185 S.W.2d at 8.
98. H.B. 1413, Printer's Number 2791, 1969 Session (tax on insurance
premiums); H.B. 2045, Printer's Number 2865, 1969 Session (repeal of tax
on insurance premiums).
99. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 34 P. 201 (1893).
100. Pangborn v. Young, 32 N.J.L. 29, 35 (Sup. Ct. 1866). See 4 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1350 (3d ed. 1940).
101. 32 N.J.L. 29 (Sup. Ct. 1866).
102. Id. at 37.
remember the danger, under the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be
apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this
character. '1 0 3 The contention of this final justification of the En-
rolled Bill Rule is that no problems concerning mistake or fraud
will arise over interpretation of journal entires. As will be seen in
the discussion of the Journal Entry Rule,104 however, the Enrolled
Bill Rule is subject to the same criticism.
B. Journal Entry Rule
The Journal Entry Rule provides that the journals, not the en-
rolled bill, are conclusively presumed to be accurate accounts of
what is contained therein. 10 5 The Pennsylvania Constitution de-
clares that the journals must contain the names of those voting on
bills,100 concurrence in amendments, 107 and conference committee
reports'0 8 and they must record the "fact" that the presiding officer
of each House signed all bills passed by the General Assembly.1 9
Some other state constitutions provide that the journal contain a
record of all proceedings. 110 It is in these latter states that the
Journal Entry Rule has received most of its support."'
It should be noted that if a Journal Entry Rule were to be ap-
plied to HB 1413, the only procedural issue which could be answered
from an examination of the journal would be, assuming the new
printer's number constituted a new bill, whether the new bill was
considered on three different days. 1 2 To answer the other issue
concerning HB 1413, whether there was a change of original pur-
pose,1 3 a court would have to refer to evidence outside the journal;
namely, the various copies of the printer's numbers. In addition,
the journal would be of no help in deciding whether there was a
change of original purpose 1 4 or whether there was more than one
subject clearly expressed in the title 1 5 in HB 2045.
Most arguments favoring the Journal Entry Rule represent con-
tentions directly opposite to those for the Enrolled Bill Rule. Chal-
lenging the doctrine of separation of powers as justification for the
Enrolled Bill Rule"0 is the position, specifically rejected in the early
103. Id. at 37-38.
104. See notes 105-25 and accompanying text infra.
105. 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1406
(3d ed. 1943).
106. PA. CONsr. art. III, § 4 (1968).
107. Id. § 5.
108. Id.
109. Id. § 8.
110. 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1406
(3d ed. 1943).
111. Id.
112. PA. CONST. art. III, § 4 (1968). See notes 28-35 and accom-
panying text supra.
113. Id. § 1. See notes 18-27 and accompanying text supra.
114. Id. See notes 48-54 and accompanying text supra.
115. Id. § 3. See notes 55-64 and accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 69-84 and accompanying text supra.
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Pennsylvania case of Kilgore v. Magee,117 that courts have the
power and duty to inquire into and determine the validity of en-
actment. Fowler v. Peirce,"' a case cited in Velasquez as repre-
sentative of arguments against the Enrolled Bill Rule,119 reasons
that the system of checks and balances requires interference:
Our notions of free institutions revolt at the idea of placing
so much power in the hands of one man, with no guard
upon it but his integrity; and our constitution has so wisely
distributed the powers of government as to make one a
check upon the other, thereby preventing one branch from
strengthening itself at the expense of the coordinate
branches, and of the public.
20
A counter to the floodgates argument is the view that it is up to the
discretion of the court whether or not the floodgates would be open
after adoption of a Journal Entry Rule.' 2 ' It could also be con-
tended that the floodgates argument is not enough reason to permit
the operation of an illegally enacted bill.122 Bull v. King'23 adopted
the Journal Entry Rule, arguing that the Enrolled Bill Rule is con-
ducive to fraud, forgery and corruption. 124 An additional argu-
ment in favor of the Journal Entry Rule is that it prevents the pro-
visions of a constitution establishing the procedure for enactment of
legislation from becoming a dead letter.
12'
The basic problem, however, with the Journal Entry Rule is
that it elevates to a high degree of authenticity a document which
is subject to fraud or mistake. Reliance on such a document as con-
clusive verification of legislative proceedings subjects laws to rather
tenuous proof. On the other hand, a strict application of the En-
rolled Bill Rule, it is submitted, is subject to valid criticism. The
problem before the courts, then, is whether a modification of the
Enrolled Bill Rule may not be the best approach.
C. Modified Enrolled Bill Rule
A minority of the courts follow a modified form of the En-
117. 85 Pa. 401 (1877).
118. 2 Cal. 165 (1852). It is interesting to note that this case was
overruled in California, in Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253 (1866), but the
reasoning is still followed in those states criticizing the Enrolled Bill Rule.
119. Velasquez v. Depuy, 46 D. & C.2d 587, 594-95 (Pa. C.P. Dauphin
1969).
120. 2 Cal. 165, 171 (1852).
121. Id.
122. Bull v. King, 205 Minn. 427, 286 N.W. 311 (1939).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 430, 286 N.W. at 313.
125. Id.
rolled Bill Rule.1 26 Sometimes referred to as the Extrinsic Evidence
Rule,127 it holds that the enrolled bill is prima facie proper but that
it is open to a clear and convincing challenge from the journals or
other extrinsic evidence. 1 28  Of the courts which allow extrinsic
evidence to impeach an enrolled bill, a number of them limit the
scope of the evidence to issues of fraud or mistake.129
It is submitted that the admission of evidence concerning fraud
or mistake in legislative enactment is a proper approach to the pro-
cedural sections of the Pennsylvania Constitution. By retaining
the Enrolled Bill Rule with this modification, a court can exclude
questions which deal with technical procedural compliance. Thus,
issues of whether a bill received consideration on three separate
days or whether there was a change of original purpose would not
be considered, unless fraud or mistake were alleged. HB 1413 and
HB 2045 would not receive judicial determination.
A rule permitting extrinsic evidence in cases of fraud or mistake
would conform with the basic duty of any legislature-to provide
laws that represent the majority will. This rule would permit ju-
dicial consideration of all those situations which raise an issue of
lack of majority will because there had been fraud or mistake. It is
with this all-inclusive fraud or mistake approach that Velasquez v.
Depuy"O° differs.
D. Velasquez v. Depuy
In Pennsylvania, the Enrolled Bill Rule is well-established law.
Following the pronouncement of the Rule in Speer v. Plank-Road
Company,13 ' several cases". 2 reaffirmed its application. The most
important was Mikell v. Philadelphia School District.33 In that
case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to decide whether a
bill, which the court concluded was not a revenue raising measure,
as the plaintiff contended," 4 actually arose in the proper House."35
The court declared that even if the bill had been a revenue bill,
"[a] failure of the legislature to follow a directory provision of the




129. Mogilner v. Metropolitan Plan Comm'n., 236 Ind. 298, 140 N.E.2d
220 (1957); Mayr v. Marion Cir. Ct., 202 Ind. 501, 176 N.E. 626 (1931);
Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 26 Misc. 2d 724, 212 N.Y.S.2d 942 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
130. 46 D. & C.2d 587 (Pa. C.P. Dauphin 1969).
131. 22 Pa. 376, 378 (1853) ("the highest evidence of its authenticity is
the enrolment [sic] in the secretary's office; ...").
132. Stewart v. Hadley, 327 Pa. 66, 193 A. 41 (1937); Perkins v. Phila-
delphia, 156 Pa. 554, 27 A. 356 (1893); Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401 (1877);
Massey v. Philadelphia, 1 W.N.C. 140 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia 1874).
133. 359 Pa. 113, 58 A.2d 339 (1948).
134. Id. at 117-18, 58 A.2d at 342.
135. PA. CONST. art. III, § 10 (1968).
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Constitution ... does not present a justiciable question .. ",,6
The defendant in Velasquez v. Depuy 137 cited the Mikell case
as support for the Enrolled Bill Rule but the plaintiff contended
Mikell did not apply.138 In Velasquez the issue was whether the
court would accept extrinsic evidence designed to show that the bill
under consideration did not receive a majority vote. The plaintiff
argued that the Mikell case and "all other Pennsylvania cases in
which the court declined to go beyond the enrolled bill"'13 9 should
be limited to those factual situations involving alleged violations
of directory, not mandatory, provisions of the constitution:
In [Mikell], the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
the mandate of Article III, Section 14 [now Section 10] of
the Pennsylvania Constitution which requires that bills
for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Repre-
sentatives, is procedural only and that the Court would not
go beyond the enrolled bill in the absence of a substantive
defect .... Thus Mikell is not authority that this Court
lacks jurisdiction to inquire into the most fundamental and
substantive of all rights in any republic, the right to have
legislation adopted only upon the concurrence of a ma-
jority of the public officials elected to represent the peo-
ple.14
0
The court denied this contention of the plaintiff, holding that what
was involved was
not a question of fraud in which that is set up as law which
never was so in form or in fact, but a question of regularity
in the conduct of those who have the power to enact the
law, and who declare it to be such ....
[W] e are of the opinion that ...the court, under the
circumstances in this case, [is not required] to proceed
further and determine how many members were present
and voted for the bill.14 '
In addition to rejecting the contention of the plaintiff that
Mikell did not apply, the Velasquez court made three basic deci-
sions. First, it held that Pennsylvania case law controlled the de-
termination by the court.142 It is submitted that this reason,
standing alone, is not sufficient reason to uphold any ruling. If the
136. Mikell v. Philadelphia School Dist., 359 Pa. 113, 123, 58 A.2d 339,
346 (1948).
137. 46 D. & C.2d 587 (Pa. C.P. Dauphin 1969).
138. Brief for Plaintiff in Opposition to Preliminary Objection of
Defendant at 11-12, Velasquez v. Depuy, 46 D. & C.2d 587 (Pa. C.P. Dau-
phin 1969).
139. Id. at 12.
140. Id. at 11-12.
141. Velasquez v. Depuy, 46 D. & C.2d 587, 614 (Pa. C.P. Dauphin 1969).
142. Id. at 609.
court were to conclude that the Enrolled Bill Rule is subject to
enough criticism that it should not be applied in its present form,
prior case law should not necessarily keep the court from adopting
what it feels is a better approach.
Secondly, the court declared:
It is worthy of note that when the final vote on House Bill
No. 1672 was taken on December 15, 1967, following days of
vigorous and spirited debate, not a single member made de-
mand for a verification or recapitulation of the vote or chal-
lenged the official proclamation by the speaker that 102
members had voted in the affirmative and that the bill had
passed, agreeably to the Constitution.1 43
The court seems to imply by this notation that the failure on the
part of the members who were absent when the vote was taken but
who were recorded as voting in the affirmative resulted in a waiver
of their rights to challenge the bill. If this is the inference the court
intended, it is subject to two arguments. The Allied Mutual Insur-
ance14 4 case represents authority that the mere fact that the legis-
lators failed to use a remedy provided does not constitute a waiver
of their rights to challenge a bill. The Velasquez court did not dis-
cuss this possibility. In addition, it could be argued that failure of
the legislators to use a point of order on the floor of the House to
challenge the bill should not bar persons affected by the legislation
from appealing.
The third basic reason for holding that the court should not go
behind the enrolled bill in this case was that there was no "allega-
tion by any member of the House that the Speaker was deceived
or acted fraudulently" when he signed the bill.1 45 The court said
that it would have examined extrinsic evidence to decide which of
two bills was genuine, 146 whether the signature of the presiding
officers were forged, 14 or whether a bill was fraudulently or mis-
takenly altered after its passage to change its original meaning.1 48
The court did refuse a private citizen the use of extrinsic evidence
to prove fraud 149 and, from its specific enumeration of those in-
stances when it would examine such evidence, it could be assumed
that the court also would not permit a legislator to prove that his
vote was fraudulently or mistakenly recorded.
It is submitted that no distinction should be drawn in deciding
a case alleging the fraudulent recording of votes or the fraudulent
certification of a bill on the basis of who initiates the action. The
143. Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
144. Allied Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bell, 353 Mo. 891, 185 S.W.2d 4 (1945).
See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
145. Velasquez v. Depuy, 46 D. & C.2d 587, 614 (Pa. C.P. Dauphin
1969).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 614.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 608-609.
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Velasquez court, however, seems to make this distinction when it
says that there was no "allegation by any member . .. that the
Speaker was deceived or acted fraudulently.' ' 150 However, the
earlier language, implying a waiver of rights to challenge the bill
on the part of the legislators, 51 would indicate that even if a mem-
ber were to allege fraud in the certification of the bill by the
Speaker or in the recording of votes the court would not hear the
appeal. The effect of the Velasquez holding is to provide no remedy
to a private citizen for appeal based on fraud and to limit a challenge
by a legislator to a motion made on the floor. It is submitted that
if the court is willing to open the door to appeals based on certain
enumerated frauds, it should permit an appeal based on fraudulent
or mistaken certification or recording of votes.
V. CONCLUSION
The passage of HB 1413 and HB 2045 raises three basic issues:
(1) Was there a change of original purpose during their passage
through either House? (2) Was HB 1413 considered on three sep-
arate days? (3) Did HB 2045 contain only one subject clearly ex-
pressed in its title? If a court were to decide the first two issues
it would need to go beyond the enrolled bill; the third issue can be
answered by examining the bill on its face.
The procedural issue in Velasquez v. Depuy,' 52 on the other
hand, is whether the bill received a majority vote.11 3 As in the first
two issues of HB 1413 and HB 2045, if a court were to review the en-
actment proceedings, it would have to go beyond the enrolled bill.
The question arises whether a court should go behind the en-
rolled bill in either case, or whether it should go beyond the en-
rolled bill in one situation but not in the other. It is submitted
that there is a distinction to be made between the situations in HB
1413 and HB 2045 and the Velasquez case. In the former, even if
there was a change of original purpose or if the bill was not con-
sidered on three different days, it was the intention of the majority
of the legislators to pass those bills despite any such violations.
However, the procedural violation in the Velasquez case involved a
possible tampering with the intention of the majority. There was
evidence that a majority had not voted in favor of the bill, and the
plaintiff alleged that the Speaker had frauduently certified the bill
as having passed by a majority vote. This is the distinguishing fea-
150. Id. at 614.
151. Id. at 607. See notes 143-44 and accompanying text supra.
152. 46 D. & C.2d 587 (Pa. C.P. Dauphin 1969).
153. Id.
ture between HB 1413-HB 2045 and the Velasquez case.
It is submitted that Velasquez v. Depuy'54 represents the type
of situation where a court should go beyond the enrolled bill.
Whatever fraud or mistake places a bill on the record which was
not intended to be the law, the enrolled bill rule should be modified
to allow proof of that fraud or mistake. The Velasquez court, how-
ever, would admit only that extrinsic evidence tending to prove
which of two purported bills is genuine, whether the signatures of
the presiding officers were forged, or whether a bill was fraudu-
lently or mistakenly altered after passage as to change its meaning.
In thus limiting the extrinsic evidence which it would admit, and in
not providing for the admission of fraud or mistake which results in
a bill becoming law without the intention of a majority of the legis-
lators, it is submitted the Velasquez holding was in error.
ROBERT F. COX, JR.*
154. Id.
